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SUMMARY 13 
This paper investigates a stochastic bi-level scheduling model for decision-making of a load serving entity (LSE) 14 
in competitive day-ahead (DA) and balancing markets with uncertainties. In this model, LSE as the main 15 
interacting player of the market sells electricity to end-use customers and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) to 16 
maximize its expected profit. Therefore, a two-level decision-making process with different objectives is 17 
considered to solve the problem. In one level, the objective is to maximize the LSE’s profit by optimally scheduling 18 
of responsive loads and PEVs charging/discharging process, while in the other level, the payments of the customers 19 
and PEV owners should be minimized in a competitive market. In the proposed decision-making process, to model 20 
the uncertainties, market prices, required energy of customers and PEVs as well as the rival LSEs’ prices are 21 
considered as random variables. The bi-level stochastic problem is then converted into a linear single-level 22 
stochastic model with equilibrium constraints by using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions as 23 
well as duality theory. A case study is implemented to indicate the applicability of the intended model. 24 
 25 
Index Terms— Bi-level scheduling, demand response, plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), energy management, load 26 
serving entity (LSE).  27 
 28 
1. INTRODUCTION 29 
 There is an appearing consensus that demand-side management (DSM) can have an active duty 30 
in keeping balance between supply and demand in future smart grids [1]. At demand side of a smart 31 
restructured power system, responsive loads can not only supply various types of demand response 32 
(DR) services such as peak load shifting and ancillary services [2], but also contribute heavily in 33 
reduction of operating cost and emission as well as improvement of system reliability [3]. Moreover, 34 
plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) as highly elastic resources at the demand side could make a number 35 
of advantages to the future smart grids by their charging and discharging power. Therefore, DSM is 36 
more important, especially when the technology such as vehicle-to-grid enables PEVs to work as the 37 
grid resources by providing power back to the system [4], [5]. 38 
A demand-side aggregator is widely contemplated as an independent load serving entity (LSE), 39 
who is responsible for making bids in electricity markets on behalf of a group of customers [6], 40 
maximizing their profits and providing their electricity demands [7]. Therefore, LSEs has a 41 
substantial duty as a middle agent between end-users and system operator and aggregates customers 42 
to take part in the electricity market. In this regard, scheduling strategies for the LSEs has been the 43 
subject area of many research works. A robust optimization approach is proposed in [8] to handle 44 
market price uncertainty, in which the retailer seeks to minimize the energy procurement costs with 45 
only considering DR programs. In [9] a strategic bidding framework for LSE agent has been proposed 46 
in which the objective is to maximize LSE’s profit by implementing DR programs. In the same work, 47 
energy management of PEVs as a significant part of responsive loads has not been considered in the 48 
LSE scheduling process. In [10], an energy management system, that simulates the tasks of an LSE, 49 
adjusts the price-responsive loads and allows the group of demands to exchange energy at proper 50 
periods such that to maximize their utility function. In the mentioned work, the energy management 51 
system is not a profit-seeking entity as it is considered in this work. A bi-level complementarity model 52 
for a price-maker energy storage system to determine the most beneficial trading actions in pool-53 
based markets, including day-ahead (DA) and balancing settlements is represented in [11]. Also, the 54 
uncertainties of the problem are incorporated into the model using a set of scenarios generated. A 55 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints has been provided by [12] to maximize the profit 56 
of PEV aggregator and to minimize the PEV owners’ costs. In [13], joint bidding and pricing problem 57 
of an LSE as a bi-level framework is modeled such that the optimal energy bids and reserve offers 58 
that the LSE submits to the wholesale electricity markets as well as its optimal energy and reserve 59 
prices in the retail electricity markets are determined simultaneously so as to maximize the LSE’s 60 
profit. Although, efficient models for LSE scheduling has been presented in [13], competition among 61 
the LSEs in the retail market has not been addressed.  62 
In most of the reviewed market models, the LSE plays as a middleman for the end-use customers 63 
and proposes the energy bids to the independent system operator (ISO). However, in fact the LSE as 64 
a mediator can specify prices different from the one defined by the ISO to make profit [14]. On the 65 
other hand, since, the electricity industry is changing into a distributed and competitive craft, 66 
competition among the market agents is facilitated. In such competitive environment, the interaction 67 
between LSEs and customers’ responses to the retail prices, should be considered in the operational 68 
decision-making of the LSE. So far, there is some works introducing competition into the LSE 69 
scheduling problem. Also, authors in [15] propose a Stackelberg game between LSEs and end-use 70 
customers to maximize their revenus. However, the effect of PEVs scheduling in decision-making of 71 
LSEs is not addressed. A market model has been provided based on game-theoretical implications in 72 
[16] where DR aggregators compete against each other to sell energy stored in consumers’ storage 73 
devices. Therefore, optimal bidding decision for each aggregator to maximize its own payments 74 
despite incomplete information in the game and remarkable changes in market circumstance is 75 
provided. However, in [16], the tendency towards optimal payments for the energy requirement 76 
derived from loads and PEV use for movement is not considered. This matter could highly affect the 77 
customer’s choice to select the fairest aggregator for its energy requirements. In other words, 78 
considering the problem only from LSEs’ perspective implies that the role of customers and their 79 
reaction to the market prices will be ignored. A decision-making framework based on time-of-use 80 
(TOU) price settings and procurement strategies in medium-term planning for a retailer agent with 81 
considering the rational responses of consumers to the TOU prices is investigated in [14]. In that 82 
study, the competitive environment due to existence of rival retailers is taken into account, although 83 
the behavior of PEV owners is neglected in that scheduling problem. A bottom-up model for DR 84 
aggregators in electricity markets proposed in [17] which enables a DR aggregator to consider the 85 
technical constraints of customers in developing an optimal trading strategy in the wholesale 86 
electricity market. Since the DR aggregator needs to be competitive in trading DR on both consumers 87 
and wholesale sides, stepwise functions is provided for load shifting and load curtailment programs. 88 
However, such functions cannot show the competition nature of the problem completely. A decision-89 
making model, based on stochastic programming, for a retailer is proposed in [18] to determine the 90 
sale price of electricity to the customers based on TOU rates. 91 
The authors in [19] have partly addressed the issue by proposing a stochastic bi-level approach for 92 
the EV aggregator in order to participate in short-term electricity market considering the preferences 93 
of EV owners. However, discharge process of EVs and DR participants has not been studied in 94 
decision-making process. Similarly, in [20] the authors have presented a scholastic scheduling model 95 
for EV aggregators in a competitive market with considering both charging and discharging process 96 
of EVs. A cooperation model between a generating company and several marketers is presented in 97 
[21] which considers the optimal decision for the generating company and the group of marketers in 98 
terms of maximization of their profits, based on bi-level optimization. Nevertheless, the works in [20] 99 
and [21] did not address the effect of DR programs.  100 
In this study, an efficient framework is provided for decision making of an LSE in a competitive 101 
energy market under uncertainties. decision-making problem of LSE is modelled as a stochastic bi-102 
level framework, in which the obtained nonlinear problem is converted into an equivalent single-103 
level mixed-integer linear programming problem by applying Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) 104 
optimality conditions [22] and duality theory. Also, a proper model of responsive loads and PEVs are 105 
developed to analyse the effect of their participation in DR programs on decision making of LSE. 106 
Compared to the previous works in this area, there exist a number of key contributions in this study. 107 
First, a proper bidding strategy for a typical LSE is introduced with considering both PEVs and DR 108 
programs from a joint customers’ and LSE’s points of view. As an extension of the model developed 109 
in prior works, this paper also considers a fully competitive energy market under rival LSEs offering 110 
prices uncertainties to enhance the market share of the under-study LSE and to determine the optimal 111 
level of its participation in DA market, positive and negative balancing markets as well as to derive 112 
optimal selling prices offered to customers and PEV owners. In addition, in the proposed strategy, 113 
both PEVs charging and discharging process is modelled and optimal offering price of the LSE and 114 
its share in discharging process of PEVs is investigated. Table I addresses a systematically 115 
comparison between the contributions of this paper and some of the recent works in the same subject 116 
area. As can be observed, most of the recent works do not consider the PEVs charging and discharging 117 
management in the optimization problems of LSEs, and they mainly investigated impacts of DR 118 
programs based on other types of responsive loads [9]. To the best of our knowledge, there are also 119 
some limited works addressing the decision-making problem of LSE by considering both PEVs’ and 120 
customers’ participation in DR programs, simultaneously. However, they did not consider 121 
competitive trading floor (e.g., [12]). As a whole, the contributions of this paper can be highlighted 122 
as: 123 
 A bi-level decision-making structure for an LSE is proposed to determine the optimal level of 124 
participation in the DA market, positive and negative balancing markets, to derive optimal 125 
selling prices offered to customers and PEV owners as well as to model the corresponding 126 
rational behaviour of those consumers to the offering prices. 127 
 The impacts of PEVs participants in discharge process on decision-making of the LSE are 128 
investigated in a competitive market via the proposed model. Also, efficient load management 129 
is implemented through incorporation of DR programs. 130 
 The reaction of PEV owners and responsive loads to the decisions made by the LSE as well as 131 
their preferences is discussed within a fully competitive market model to enhance the market 132 
share of the LSE. 133 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the proposed decision-making problem 134 
of the LSE is explained. The problem formulation is given in section 3 and in section 4, the 135 
simulations and numerical results are provided. At last, section 5 draws the conclusions. 136 
 137 
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 139 
2. STOCHASTIC-BASED DECISION-MAKING PROBLEM OF LSE 140 
In a fully competitive electricity market, LSEs play a critical role to fill the gaps between end 141 
customers and wholesale market operators to connect them into an optimal operation framework. As 142 
a profit-seeking organization, the objective of LSEs is to maximize their expected profit considering 143 
the uncertainty from both wholesale market and end-use customers. Naturally, LSEs will have the 144 
motivation to induce the end-use customers' inherent elasticity by offering DR programs, especially 145 
when the system is under stress or close to the next binding constraint, which is termed as a critical 146 
load level. In this paper, a decision-making model is investigated for an LSE that supports some 147 
responsive loads (e.g., controllable residential and industrial loads) and PEVs as depicted in Figure 148 
1. The under-study LSE has a take-or-pay contract [23] to buy energy from DA and balancing markets 149 
while it sells electricity to the customers under real-time pricing scheme in a competitive 150 
environment. Here, it is assumed that the customers have smart energy management devices and can 151 
tune their demand to mitigate their energy consumption costs by responding to the prices offered by 152 
LSEs. Also, they can supply their demand from fair LSE based on the prices offered by each LSE 153 
and can change their LSE in a short-term time span. This is plausible by constructing fast 154 
communication infrastructure with bidirectional data transition among the LSEs and responsive loads 155 
and the PEV parking lots [24]. It should be noted that, responsive loads can take part in price-based 156 
DR programs with common schemes comprising sheddable and shiftable loads [25]. Moreover, PEV 157 
owners can reduce their payments by choosing proper LSE for charging and discharging process. 158 
The proposed decision-making problem of LSE for scheduling of the responsive loads and PEVs 159 
has a two-level structure where in the upper level, the LSE aims at maximizing its expected profit 160 
from taking part in pool-based short-term electricity market comprising of DA and balancing markets. 161 
In this level, scheduled energy exchanges for the next day are specified and then the energy deviations 162 
are obtained and compensated in the balancing market. Also, the LSE suggests optimal bids to the 163 
PEV owners and end-use customers to encourage them making interactive energy trading. Since, the 164 
actions of rival LSEs affect the decision-making of the under-study LSE, the prices offered by rivals 165 























Figure 1. Schematic of the LSE problem. 169 
 170 
      In the lower level, there are several customers that should adjust their loads based on offered 171 
prices by LSEs and purchase their needed energy through the most appropriate LSE. Moreover, 172 
PEVs’ owners are willing to buy energy from the LSE with the lowest charging costs or to sell energy 173 
through discharging of the batteries, with the highest prices to minimize their total payments. To this 174 
end, by using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions, the equivalent single-level form 175 
of the proposed scheme can be obtained. Moreover, the bilinear products are substituted by their 176 
equivalent statements using strong duality theorem. The structure of bi-level decision making for 177 
taking part of the LSE in the DA and balancing trading floor is shown in Figure 2. 178 
Here, the realizations of uncertainties are modeled using the scenario generation process based on 179 
Monte-Carlo simulations (MCS) and roulette wheel mechanism (RWM). At first the distribution 180 
function is separated into different intervals with different standard deviations [19]. Then, each 181 
interval is related to a certain probability that is obtained by the probability density functions (PDF) 182 
[19]. Each scenario vector includes the information of electricity market, loads of customers, PEVs 183 
charging and discharging power and the prices offered by the rivals. Then a specified number of the 184 
probable scenarios are chosen precisely using K-means algorithm [26]. Finally, the achieved 185 
equivalent single-level stochastic problem is considered as a mixed-integer linear problem (MILP). 186 
3. THE PROPOSED DECISION MAKING FORMULATION 187 
 The proposed decision-making problem of LSE is formulated as a stochastic bi-level 188 
programming problem and presented in this section. 189 
 190 
3.1 Upper-level Viewpoint 191 
In the upper-level, the LSE bids to the electricity market while competing against rival LSEs to 192 
offer optimal prices to customers and PEV owners to maximize its expected profit. Therefore, the 193 
expected profit includes the income from selling energy to both customers and PEVs and participating 194 
in negative balancing market minus the costs due to purchasing energy from DA and positive 195 
balancing markets and buying energy from PEVs in discharging mode. Hence, in the upper-level, the 196 

























































































Maximize LSE expected profit
Subject to:
1. LSE energy balance
2. Input energy constraint
3. non-anticipativity
Determine:
1. Offering optimal prices to the customers
2. The energy interaction with the upstream 
3. The energy interaction with customers
4. The energy interaction with PEVs
Maximize LSE expected profit (Linear form)
Subject to:
1. LSE energy balance
2. Input energy constraint
3. Non-anticipativity
4. LSE stationary conditions
5. Demand load energy interaction constraint
6. PEVs energy interaction constraint
7. Customers energy consumption constraint
8. PEVs energy consumption constraint
9. Technical constraint of PEVs batteries 
10. LSE primal optimality conditions
11. LSE complementary slackness conditions 
Determine:
1. Offering optimal prices to the customers
2. The energy interaction with the upstream 
3. The energy interaction with customers and PEVs
4. The share of the LSE to supply customers
Minimize the customers costs
Subject to:
1. Demand load energy interaction constraint
2. PEVs energy interaction constraint
3. Customers energy consumption constraint
4. PEVs energy consumption constraint
5. Technical constraint of PEVs batteries
Determine:
1. The most competitive LSE for energy 
interactions























































































Figure 2. The bi-level framework of decision-making of LSE. 199 
 200 
Subject to the following constraints, 201 
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Equation (1) indicates the objective function from the under-study LSE perspective. Constraint (2) 202 
investigates the energy balance. The under-study LSE contributes to provide the required energy of 203 
customers and PEVs based on Constraints (3)-(5). That is the estimated energy supplied by the under 204 
study LSE that is equal to the expected value of the demand of the responsive loads and 205 
charge/discharge of EVs supplied by the LSE over all rival-LSEs price scenarios. The non-206 
anticipativity is demonstrated in (6) and confirms similar DA bids for equal DA prices at each hour t 207 
and scenario ω [27]. The energy transaction in both balancing markets is limited based on constraints 208 
(7) and (8), respectively.  209 
 210 
3.2 Lower-level Viewpoint 211 
The objective in the lower-level consists of the objectives of customers and PEV owners to minimize 212 
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 215 
where, s and sꞌ mention the transfer of customers and PEV owners among the LSEs, and index s=0 216 
shows the under-study LSE. The payment made by the customers and EV owners to the under-study 217 
and rival LSEs is characterized through the first two lines in (9), respectively. The unwillingness of 218 
both customers and PEV owners to alter their LSE is determined in the third line. In other words, the 219 
last line states the reluctance of customers to switch among LSEs. Since, the prices offered by the 220 
rivals are uncertain to the under-study LSE, it approximates prices offered by the rivals through a set 221 
of scenarios to adjust its selling price to the customers. In this regard, at first, the prices of rivals are 222 
forecasted based on historical data and then the uncertainties of prices offered by all rivals are 223 
extracted based on their corresponding errors, and then normal probability density functions (PDFs) 224 
are calculated based on previous records of the rivals’ prices. In this study, PDFs of rivals’ prices are 225 
divided into three discrete intervals with different probability levels. Here, the scenarios are generated 226 
based on the hourly price forecasts with a uniform random error of ±10% for hourly rivals’ prices 227 
[29]. Then, the selling price of the LSE is computed based on a bi-level stochastic program in which 228 
different uncertainties are investigated via stochastic programming. The obtained price of the LSE is 229 
considered to enable consumers and PEVs’ owners to track the price changes and manage their 230 
consumption accordingly. The load management process could be an automatic procedure 231 
implemented through an energy management and automation system. In other words, the proposed 232 
automated DR consists of fully automated signaling from a utility (which is the LSE in our case) to 233 
provide automated connectivity to customer end-use control systems and strategies. It should be noted 234 
that from the practical point of view, a main concern lies on the technological side which reflects 235 
barriers that are related to the advanced systems implementations and associated interfaces between 236 
users and operator. However, with the growth of smart technology these barriers are deemed to be 237 
overcome. Generally, the equations represented LSEs competition in the proposed decision making 238 








































In order to abbreviate the equations, symbol   is used which refers to the charge/discharge process 242 
of PEVs and demand loads. In other words, in the above formulations, for simplicity of derivation, 243 
index   is used instead of Ch, Dis and D indices. Constraint (10) discusses the contribution of LSEs 244 
to provide energy for both customers and PEVs. It shows the increment and decrement from base 245 
demand in scenario ζ at period t for each LSE. All of the LSEs should supply all the required energy 246 
of loads and PEVs in their jurisdiction based on constraint (11). Constraint (12) represents that the 247 
amount of demand that is provided by each LSE is not negative. Also, technical constraints of PEVs' 248 
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 250 
Constraints (13)-(15) provide the technical constraints of the PEV battery. Dual variables of each 251 
constraint in the lower-level problem are shown right after their corresponding constraints following 252 
a colon that will be used to transform lower-level problem into its dual problem. Moreover, the 253 
responsive loads participate in DR programs and change their energy usage based on the price 254 
suggested by LSEs and the defined elasticity. Demand elasticity is indicated as demand reaction to 255 
the price signal [29]. The customers’ energy consumption behavior can be adjusted in response to the 256 
incentives received based on the load level changes and the electricity prices. To achieve maximum 257 
benefit, end-use consumers manage their energy usage pattern in period t from an initial value, int,DtE  258 
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where, )( , D
D
tES  and )( , D
D
tEB  represent the benefit and income of customers after performing DR 265 




































   (18) 
In this study, a quadratic utility function, is used to incentivize the participation of responsive loads 268 
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Additionally, based on cross-elasticity coefficients [30], which are defined as demand sensitivity of 274 
the tth period with respect to the price elasticity at hth period, the amount of demand after the DR can 275 


































































The uncertainties on DA price, positive and negative balancing market prices as well as demand of 279 
customers and PEVs are modeled via random variables that are represented using a finite set of 280 



















t EEEscenario  ,,,,,, ,,Pr,Pr,Pr  (26) 
Each scenario  has the probability of occurrence )( , in such a way that the sum of the 282 
probabilities over all scenarios is equal to 1. Therefore, the uncertainty associated with the offering 283 










Pr,Pr,Pr  (27) 
The sum of the probabilities over all scenarios of set of  is also 1. Since the first set of scenarios is 286 
considered independent of the scenarios associated with the prices offered by the LSEs, the authors 287 
distinguish two sets of scenarios to better undersetting problem formulations. However, all 288 
scenarios should be combined in problem solving process. 289 
 290 
3.3 Combination of Upper and Lower Levels 291 













Pr  in 292 
(1). Here, the KKT conditions are applied and to the lower-level problem in (9)–(18) and are merged 293 
to the upper-level. Also, by using duality theorem [19], the bilinear terms are substituted with their 294 
equivalent statements as bellow: 295 
 296 
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 297 
Afterwards, the single-level MILP problem is obtained which includes the objective function of the 298 
upper-level, the constraints and limitations of both upper- and lower-levels and the statement which 299 
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 302 
Also, this objective function is limited with the constraints (2)-(8), (10)-(15), (25) and the constraints 303 
that achieved from applying KKT and duality theory. It should be noted that after obtaining the upper-304 
level and lower-level problem formulation independently, Lagrange function of the lower-level is 305 
achieved. The KKT optimality condition of the lower-level problem is obtained by partial derivatives 306 
of the Lagrange function. Accordingly, the lower-level problem is incorporated to the upper-level 307 
and the bi-level problem is formed.  Finally, a conversion to the equivalent single-level linear 308 
optimization form is applied. Also, the bilinear products of continuous variables are replaced by their 309 
equivalent linear expressions. Bellow, only the abbreviation form of the constraints are represented. 310 
The constraints that are introduced in the form of 00  ba  denote the nonlinear form of311 
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 314 
where, 1K and 

















t  , are 315 
auxiliary variables in obtaining KKT optimality conditions.  316 
4. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS 317 
4.1 Case Study 318 
The obtained program is implemented on a test system with four LSEs (i.e., LSE0, LSE1, LSE2 319 
and LSE3) that supply a number of PEVs and smart responsive loads. LSE0 is the under-study LSE 320 
and the others are considered as rivals. The time horizon for scheduling of LSE is one day with 24 321 
equal hours. Figure 3 illustrates the forecasted demand of both customers and PEVs. The pattern of 322 
PEVs demand is obtained based on [14], which represents how demand of PEVs changes during a 323 
day. It should be noted that in each time period of the scheduling horizon, only a number of PEVs 324 
are connected to the network and can participate in DR program. All the PEVs are supposed to have 325 
the same battery capacity of 16kWh and only 20% of them desire to take part in discharge process. 326 
The initial SoC of PEVs at each scenario as well as the initial hourly demands supplied by each LSE 327 
are randomized. Moreover, Figure 4 illustrates the forecasted prices of electricity market that are 328 
extracted from Nordpool market [30]. The forecasted errors of each stochastic variable are generated 329 
using associated PDF in which the forecasted values are considered as mean values. Here, the PDFs 330 
are separated into five discrete intervals with related probabilities. Standard deviation of the 331 
responsive loads, PEVs demand, DA and negative balancing market prices forecast errors are 332 
considered ±15% [31]. Also, standard deviation of positive balancing prices forecast errors is 333 
considered ±5% [32]. In addition, the forecasted prices offered by rival LSEs are extracted from [19] 334 
by some modifications. The associated scenarios of rival prices are generated with three segment 335 
normal PDF and their forecasted errors are considered ±20% [29]. Finally, the price elasticity of loads 336 
is extracted from [33]. The forecasted errors are generated based on 1000 scenarios by using MCS 337 
and RWM. After generation of 1000 initial scenarios, K-means algorithm is used to reduce the 338 
number of scenarios into 45. Afterwards, the selected scenarios are used in the proposed problem and 339 
the optimization is executed by CPLEX solver using GAMS software [34] on a PC with 4 GB of 340 
RAM and Intel Core i7 @ 2.60 GHz processor. 341 
 342 
 343 
Figure 3. The hourly forecasted loads of customers and charging demand of PEVs. 344 
 345 
 346 
Figure 4. Hourly forecasted electricity price of DA, positive and negative balancing markets. 347 
 348 
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4.2 Numerical Results 349 
The profiles of the expected energy procured by the under-study LSE from DA, positive and 350 
negative balancing markets, following the proposed optimization strategy, are obtained and shown in 351 
Figure 5. As it is observed, the LSE purchases a major part of the needed energy from DA market 352 
and mitigates the outcomes of different uncertain resources by trading energy in balancing market. 353 
In some periods, especially at peak hours when the prices of positive balancing market are very high, 354 
the LSE purchases most of the required energy from DA market. Therefore, its contribution in 355 
positive balancing market is very low (even zero in some time slots) as observed from Fig. 5 (b). 356 
Moreover, when the prices of negative balancing market are relatively high (e.g., 14:00-16:00 based 357 
on Figure 4), the LSE bids for load reduction in negative balancing market to achieve more profit. 358 
Figure 6 depicts the prices suggested by the under study LSE and the forecasted offering prices of 359 
rival LSEs during the scheduling horizon. Here, it is assumed that similar price offering scheme is 360 
applied to responsive loads as well as charging PEVs. As can be seen, LSE0 offers competitive 361 
charging prices at all hours to attract more customers. In fact, in a competitive market, a decrease in 362 
offered price can be a way of increasing the amount of responsive loads and PEVs that are supplied. 363 
Moreover, the bid prices offered by LSE0 in most hours are high enough to attract more PEV owners 364 
for discharging process. To get better insight into this bidding strategy, the charge price signal offered 365 
by the under-study LSE is evaluated in some hours. For example, from 1:00 to 6:00 when the market 366 
prices and demand loads are low, LSE0 offers moderate prices to remain in the game. Moreover, from 367 
9:00 to 12:00, or at 18:00 and 19:00, although the market prices are high (Figure 4), LSE0 offers 368 
lower charging prices to keep more customers interested in energy purchases. Moreover, the prices 369 
offered by the under-study LSE for discharging of PEVs are shown in Figure 6 (b). During these 370 
hours LSE0 tries to purchase energy from the PEVs’ owners, and not from the market, with high 371 
prices. However, it proposes the lowest discharging rates at 14:00-16:00, in which the DA and 372 















































Figure 5. Behavior of the under-study LSE in different markets, (a) DA market, (b) positive 376 







Figure 6. The prices proposed by all LSEs, (a) charging prices, (b) discharging prices. 380 
 381 
The percentages of demand loads together with charging and discharging energies of PEVs 382 
supplied by all LSEs are shown in Figure 7. It can be clearly understood that in a competitive 383 
environment when the selling price offered by a given LSE is the lowest, its related market share is 384 
the highest. To this end, comparing Figure 6 (a) and Figure 7 (a) shows that the under-study LSE is 385 
the dominant player of market at 7:00, 9:00-11:00, 14:00-19:00, 21:00 and 22:00 due to its most 386 
competitive bids. The same procedure happens during 1:00-6:00 when LSE2 takes the market power. 387 
Similar analysis can be made for supplying PEVs’ demand by LSEs. However, it is observed from 388 
Figure 7 (c), the share of LSE0 in buying discharge energy from PEVs is high most of the times due 389 
to its higher price offers (Figure 6 (b)).  390 
In order to assess the behavior of customers and PEV owners in choosing the LSEs, Table II shows 391 
the transferred demand, charge and discharge of PEVs among the LSEs at different sample times. As 392 
mentioned before, the loads can be transferred from one LSE to another one based on the offered 393 
prices (see equation (10)). Noted that the minus sign indicates a demand transferred in the opposite 394 
orientation. As can be seen from the same table, at 4:00 for example, 17.46% of the responsive loads 395 
transferred from LSE0 to LSE2. Instead, 2.57% and 7.95% of responsive loads will be shifted from 396 
LSE1 and LSE3 to LSE0, respectively. Moreover, 20.03% of responsive loads will be transferred from 397 
LSE1 with the highest price to LSE0 that has the lowest price offers. The results also show that PEVs’ 398 










































































owners have the same behavior in choosing their LSE for charging process. However, it should be 399 
noted that LSEs which offer the highest discharge incentives are selected by the PEVs owners. Such 400 
conditions can be seen at 8:00 when LSE0 offers the highest discharge incentives which in turn 401 
increases its share in negative balancing market. These behaviors simply show that the customers 402 
usually track the price signals to choose the most competitive LSE for satisfying both the energy 403 
needs and economic objectives. Therefore, in a competitive market, optimal offering strategy of the 404 
LSE has a substantial effect on the behavior of customers and PEVs owners in choosing a proper 405 









Figure 7. Share of LSEs in supplying (a) customers, (b) charging of PEVs, and (b) discharging of 408 
PEVs.  409 
 410 
















 At 4:00  
Responsive loads -2.57 17.46 -7.95 20.03 -5.38 -25.41 
Charge of PEVs -0.27 22.06 -5.65 22.33 -5.38 -27.71 
Discharge of PEVs -0.31 16.94 -11.78 17.25 -11.47 -28.72 
  At 8:00  


























































































Responsive loads 18.73 2.11 -9.06 -16.62 -27.79 11.17 
Charge of PEVs 18.5 2.46 19.63 -16.62 -27.75 11.17 
Discharge of PEVs -17.65 -12.63 -30.51 5.02 -12.86 -17.88 
  At 15:00  
Responsive loads -9.82 -6.95 -17.88 2.87 -8.06 10.93 
Charge of PEVs -7.57 -2.46 -15.63 5.11 -8.06 13.17 
Discharge of PEVs 18.3 9.517 -3.14 -8.783 -21.44 -12.657 
 413 
In order to analyze the role of discharge process on the expected profit, revenues and payments of 414 
the under-study LSE, Table III is provided. As observed from the table, by increasing the PEVs’ 415 
participation in the discharging process, revenue of the LSE and its expected profit increases. In other 416 
words, the LSE provides more energy from discharge of PEVs and its purchase from costly DA or 417 
positive market decreases. For more detailed investigation, the hourly profit of the LSE in three 418 
practical levels of PEVs participants in discharge is illustrated in Figure 8. As can be seen, by 419 
increasing the share of PEVs in discharging process, the expected profit of the LSE0 increases usually, 420 
especially when the DA and positive market prices are comparatively high. Moreover, the total 421 
expected profit of the LSE varies from 135.12 € in without discharge of PEVs to 190.06 € (with a 422 
share of 40% in the same market) which denotes an increment of 40.7% in the expected profit. 423 
Therefore, PEVs participation in discharge process has a great impact on the expected profit of the 424 




















0% 137.55    86.68    1257.49  -1196.02  0.00   
10% 153.57    133.49    1263.92  -1196.42  -47.42   
20% 167.05    187.81   1263.92  -1191.53  -93.15   
30% 179.18    224.45   1263.92  -1179.20  -129.99   
40% 190.06    273.40   1263.92  -1177.82  -169.44   
50% 200.71    306.27   1263.92  -1170.26  -199.21   
60% 209.27    312.74   1263.92   -1159.30  -208.09   
70% 218.42    346.98   1356.90   -1249.94    -235.53    
80% 226.30    371.45   1430.77   -1316.45  -259.47   
90%  232.42     371.45   1430.77   -1311.65   -258.16   





Figure 8. Hourly profit of the under-study LSE in different percentage of PEVs’ participation in 435 
discharge process. 436 

















0%, Profit= 135.12  €
20%, Profit= 167.05 €
40%, Profit= 190.06 €
 437 
To further analyze the effectiveness of the proposed approach, other case studies implemented 438 
here. To this end, the proposed strategy is applied in situations where different DA or balancing 439 
market pricing schemes may be realized in a given day (each with 24h) in a year as shown in Figure 440 
9. Figure 10 shows the DA energy bidding profiles. As seen from Figure 10, the LSE tends to supply 441 
loads; i.e., buying low energy bids during off-peak periods (e.g., 1:00–7:00 during midnight to 442 
morning) and high energy bids during peak periods (e.g., 17:00–22:00). The energy imbalances are 443 
compensated in regulating market as shown in Figure 11and Figure 12. As seen, the lack of energy 444 
to supply the loads specifically during peak hours could be compensated easily by buying energy and 445 
the surplus energy generated from discharge process can be sold to obtain some revenues. 446 
Figure 13 shows the offering prices of all LSEs during scheduling horizon for DR, charge and 447 
discharge processes. As can be seen, the pattern of price signal offered by the under-study LSE is 448 
affected by the one offered by competitors. Also, if the rivals' discharge price is assumed to be the 449 
same as the one offered for charge process, the pattern of price signal offered by the under-study LSE 450 
is affected by the one offered by competitors as in Figure 13. It should be noted that the proposed 451 
architecture is valid for different pricing schemes which relates to different internal data.  452 
Figure 14, provides the percentage of loads and EVs to be supplied by all LSEs. As observed, the 453 
customers choose the LSE with the lowest prices for energy purchases while they tend to augment 454 
their revenues by selling energy to the LSE with the highest bids. So, it can be concluded that different 455 




Figure 9. Electricity market prices 460 
 461 
 462 
Figure 10. DA energy bidding 463 
 464 









































Figure 11. The energy trading in negative balancing market 466 
 467 
 468 








Figure 13. The prices proposed by all LSEs, (a) charging prices, (b) discharging prices. 477 




































































































Figure 14. Share of LSEs in supplying (a) customers, (b) charging of PEVs, and (b) discharging of 485 
PEVs.  486 
 487 
5. CONCLUSION 488 
This paper investigated a stochastic bi-level scheduling strategy for an LSE in a competitive 489 
environment. The uncertainties related to the market prices, demand loads, charging/discharging 490 
power of PEVs and the prices suggested by rival LSEs were simulated via stochastic programming. 491 
The obtained nonlinear bi-level problem was converted into an equivalent single-level mixed-integer 492 
linear programming problem by applying KKT optimality conditions and duality theory. Finally, the 493 
proposed scheduling framework was applied to a case-study. The numerical outcomes demonstrated 494 
that: 495 
 The LSE participates in DA and balancing markets to procure energy for serving loads in a 496 
competitive market. However, this participation should be complemented by an appropriate 497 
bidding strategy to be profitable. 498 
 When the prices of DA and positive balancing markets are relatively high, an optimal strategy for 499 
the LSE is to motivate PEV owners for discharge process to participate in negative balancing 500 
market. In this way the LSE would feed the loads through PEVs discharging instead of buying 501 
from the expensive DA and positive balancing markets. 502 























































































 In a competitive market, the customers usually select the most competitive LSE to trade with. In 503 
other words, they buy energy through the cheapest one and selling energy to the one(s) with the 504 
highest price offers to meet their objectives.  505 
 506 
Nomenclature 507 
Sets and indices 
,)( t  At time t and scenario . 
,)( t  At time t and scenario . 
D/Ch/Dis Index of demand of customers/Charge/Discharge mode. 
)(', SNss  Indices (set) of LSEs. 
t (T) Index (set) of time periods. 
 ω(Ω) Scenario index (set) related to market prices, customers' loads and charge/discharge process. 
  ( ) Index (set) for scenarios of rival LSEs.  
  The sign that shows the index of both responsive loads and EVs charge/discharge process. 
a b Complementarity conditions between a and b. 
Variables 
DisChDE //  Energy supplied by the under-study LSE (MWh). 
)(
 BB EE  Energy exchanged in positive (negative) balancing markets (MWh). 
DAE
 
Energy purchased from day-ahead market (MWh). 
)(wes  Lagrange coefficient.
 D
tE  
Energy deviation from the base case once participating in DR programs (MWh) 

sL  
Percentage of loads supplied by rival LSEs (%). 

0s
L  Percentage of loads supplied by the under-study LSE (%). 

ssM ,  Percentage of loads transferred among the LSEs (%). 

ts ,0
Pr  Selling price offered by the under-study LSE to the customers (€/MWh). 
R  The cost models the unwillingness of customers and PEV owners to change their LSE (€). 
vRe  The revenue obtained by the under study LSE (€). 
)( Zs
X
s SS  Binary variable for complementary slackness conditions. 
S (B) The benefit and income of customers after performing DR program (€). 




  Auxiliary variables of KKT optimality conditions corresponding with technical constraints of PEVs. 
Parameters 
)( ,, httt ElasElas  
The self (cross) elasticity of loads. 
CapE  Capacity of PEV battery (MWh). 
int,DE  Initial demand of loads before participating in DR programs (MWh). 
DE
 
Total demand required (MWh). 
tE

 The expected demand (MWh). 

2,1K  
Constants to obtain equivalent linear expressions of lower level problem. 
DisChP /  Charged (discharged) power (MWh). 
)(PrPr
 BB  Prices of positive (negative) balancing market (€/MWh). 
DAPr
 
Day-ahead market prices (€/MWh). 
int,PrDAt  









[1] Vahedipour-Dahraie M, Najafi HR, Anvari-Moghaddam A, and Guerrero JM. Optimal scheduling of distributed energy resources 511 
and responsive loads in islanded microgrids considering voltage and frequency security constraints. J. Renewable Sustainable 512 
Energy, 2018; 10(2): 025903. 513 
[2] Sharifi R, Anvari-Moghaddam A, Fathi SH, Guerrero JM, Vahidinasab V. Economic demand response model in liberalized 514 
electricity markets with respect to flexibility of consumers”, IET Gener. Trans. Dist., 2017; 11 (7): pp.4291 – 4298. 515 
[3] Vahedipour-Dahraie M, Anvari-Moghaddam A, and Guerrero JM. Evaluation of reliability in risk-constrained scheduling of 516 
autonomous microgrids with demand response and renewable resources. IET Renew. Power Gener., 2018; 12(6): 657-667. 517 
[4] Wang X, and Liang Q. Energy management strategy for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles via bidirectional vehicle-to-grid. IEEE 518 
Systems Journal, 2017; 11 (3): 1789 – 1798. 519 
[5] Chen YW, and Chang JM. Fair demand response with electric vehicles for the cloud based energy management service. IEEE 520 
Trans. Smart Grid, 2018; 9 (1): 458-468. 521 
[6] Yazdani-Damavandi M, Neyestani N, Shafie-khah M, Contreras J, and.Catalao JPS. Strategic Behavior of Multi-Energy Players 522 
in Electricity Markets as Aggregators of Demand Side Resources using a Bi-level Approach. IEEE Trans. Power Systems, 2018; 523 
33 (1): 397–411. 524 
[7] Xu Z, Hu Z, Song Y, and Wang J. Risk-Averse Optimal Bidding Strategy for Demand-Side Resource Aggregators in Day-Ahead 525 
Electricity Markets Under Uncertainty. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2017; 8 (1): 96-105. 526 
[8] Nojavan S, Nourollahi R, Pashaei-Didani H, Zare K. Uncertainty-based electricity procurement by retailer using robust 527 
optimization approach in the presence of demand response exchange. Electrical Power and Energy Systems, vol. 105, 2019, pp. 528 
237–248. 529 
[9] Fang X, Hu Q, Li F, Wang B, and Li Y. Coupon-Based Demand Response Considering Wind Power Uncertainty: A Strategic 530 
Bidding Model for Load Serving Entities. IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2016; 31(2): 1025 – 1037. 531 
[10] Rahimiyan M, Baringo L, and Conejo AJ. Energy management of a cluster of interconnected price-responsive demands. IEEE 532 
Trans. Power Syst., 2014; 29(2): 645–655. 533 
[11] Nasrolahpour E, Kazempour J, Zareipour H, and William D. Rosehart. A Bilevel Model for Participation of a Storage System in 534 
Energy and Reserve Markets. IEEE Tran. Sustainable Energy, vol. 9, no. 2, 2018. pp. 582 – 598. 535 
[12] Momber I, Wogrin S, and Román TGS. Retail Pricing: A Bilevel Program for PEV Aggregator Decisions Using Indirect Load 536 
Control. IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2016; 31(1): 464–473. 537 
[13] Xu H, Zhang K, and Zhang J. Optimal Joint Bidding and Pricing of Profit-seeking Load Serving Entity. IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 538 
2018; 33(5): 5427–5436. 539 
[14] Sekizaki S, Nishizaki I, hayashida T. Decision making of electricity retailer with multiple channels of purchase based on fractile 540 
criterion with rational responses of consumers. Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 2019, vol. 105, pp. 877–893. 541 
[15] Maharjan S, Zhu Q, Zhang Y, Gjessing S, and Basar T. Dependable demand response management in the smart grid: A 542 
Stackelberg game approach. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2013; 4(1): 120–132. 543 
[16] Motalleb M, Ghorbani M. Non-cooperative game-theoretic model of demand response aggregator competition for selling stored 544 
energy in storage devices. Applied Energy, 2017; 202: 581–596. 545 
[17] Mahmoudi N, Heydarian-Forushani E, Shafie-khah M, Saha TK, Golshan MEH, Siano P, "A bottom-up approach for demand 546 
response aggregators’participation in electricity markets, Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 143, 2017, pp. 121–129. 547 
[18] Hatami A, Seifi H,  and Sheikh-El-Eslami M.K. A Stochastic-Based Decision-Making Framework for an Electricity Retailer: 548 
Time-of-Use Pricing and Electricity Portfolio Optimization. IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1808-1816, Nov. 549 
2011. 550 
[19] Rashidizadeh-Kermani H, Najafi H, Anvari-Moghaddam A, and Guerrero JM. Optimal Decision-Making Strategy of an Electric 551 
Vehicle Aggregator in Short-Term Electricity Markets. Energies, 2018; 11 (9): 1-20. 552 
[20] Rashidizadeh-Kermani H, Vahedipour-Dahraie M, Najafi HR, Anvari-Moghaddam A, and Guerrero JM. A Stochastic Bi-level 553 
Scheduling Approach for Participation of EV Aggregators in Competitive Electricity Markets. Appl. Sci., 2017; 7 (10): 1-16. 554 
[21] Guzmán Acuña L, Ramírez Ríos D, Paternina Arboleda C, González Ponzón E. Cooperation model in the electricity energy 555 
market using bi-level optimization and Shapley value. Operations Research Perspectives, vol. 5, 2018, pp. 161-168. 556 
[22] Carrión M, Arroyo JM, and Conejo A.J. A Bilevel Stochastic Programming Approach for Retailer Futures Market Trading. IEEE 557 
Trans. Power Systems, 2009; 24(3): 1446-1456. 558 
[23] Conti S, Nicolosi R, Rizzo SA, and Zeineldin H.H. Optimal dispatching of distributed generators and storage systems for MV 559 
islanded microgrids. IEEE Trans. Power Deliv., 2012; 27 (3): 1243–1251. 560 
[24] Akhavan-Rezai E, Shaaban MF, El-Saadany EF, Karray F. Online Intelligent Demand Management of Plug-In Electric Vehicles 561 
P  Restriction for energy trading with the network (MWh). 
SoC  ( SoC) Minimum (maximum) limitation of SoC. 
int,
,, tsU  
Primary percentage of loads and PEVs that is supplied by each LSE s. 
  Probability of scenario . 
  Probability of scenario  . 
in Future Smart Parking Lots. IEEE Systems Journal, 2016; 10, (2): 483 – 494. 562 
[25] Rashidizadeh-Kermani H, Vahedipour-Dahraie M, Shafie-khah M, Catalão JPS. A bi-level risk-constrained offering strategy of 563 
a wind power producer considering demand side resources. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2019; 564 
104: 562-574. 565 
[26] Arthur D, and Vassilvitskii S. K-means++: The advantages of careful seeding. in Proc. 18th Annu. ACM-SIAM Symp Discrete 566 
Algorithms (SODA ‘07),” New Orleans, LA, USA, 2007; 1027-1035. 567 
[27] Morales JM, Conejo AJ, and Pérez-Ruiz J. Short-Term Trading for a Wind Power Producer. IEEE Trans. Power Sys., 2010; 25(1): 568 
554-564. 569 
[28] Vahedipour‐Dahraei M, Najafi HR, Anvari‐Moghaddam A, Guerrero JM. Security‐constrained unit commitment in AC 570 
microgrids considering stochastic price‐based demand response and renewable generation. Int. Trans. Electr. Energ. Syst., DOI: 571 
10.1002/etep.2596. 572 
[29] Rashidizadeh-Kermani H, Vahedipour-Dahraie M, Anvari-Moghaddam A, and Guerrero JM. Stochastic risk‐constrained 573 
decision‐making approach for a retailer in a competitive environment with flexible demand side resources. Int. Trans. Electr. 574 
Energ. Syst., https://doi.org/10.1002/etep.2719, (2018). 575 
[30] Nordic Electricity, available online: www.nordpool .com, Accessed on 5 September 2016. 576 
[31] N. Rezaei, and M. Kalantar. Economic–environmental hierarchical frequency management of a droop-controlled islanded 577 
microgrid. Energy Converse. Manage., 2014; 88: 498-515. 578 
[32] Rezaei N, and Kalantar M. Smart microgrid hierarchical frequency control ancillary service provision based on virtual inertia 579 
concept: An integrated demand response and droop controlled distributed generation framework. Energy Converse. Manage., 580 
2015; 92: 287-301. 581 
[33] Vahedipour-Dahraie M, Rashidizadeh-Kermani H, Najafi HR, Anvari- Moghaddam A, and Guerrero JM. Stochastic Security and 582 
Risk-Constrained Scheduling for an Autonomous Microgrid with Demand Response and Renewable Energy Resources. IET 583 
Renew. Power Gener., 2017; 11(14): 1118-1121. 584 
[34] GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) [Computer software]. GAMS Development Corp., Washington, DC.  585 
 586 
 587 
 588 
 589 
 590 
